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Summary
Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are responsible for many of the more than
2,000 deaths and numerous casualties suffered by U.S. and coalition forces since the
invasion of Iraq.1  The bombs have been hidden behind signs and guardrails, under
roadside debris, or inside animal carcasses, and encounters with IEDs are becoming
more numerous and deadly.  The threat has expanded to include vehicle-borne IEDs,
where insurgents drive cars laden with explosives directly into a targeted group of
service members.  DOD efforts to counter IEDs have proven only marginally effective,
and U.S. forces continue to be exposed to the threat at military checkpoints, or whenever
riding in vehicles in Iraq.  DOD reportedly expects that mines and IEDs will continue
to be  weapons of choice for insurgents for the near term in Iraq, and is also concerned
that they might eventually become more widely used by other insurgents and terrorists
worldwide.  This report will be updated as events warrant.
Background
Improvised explosive devices, or IEDs, now cause about half of all the American
combat casualties in Iraq, both killed-in-action and wounded.2  The Iraqi insurgents make
videos of exploding U.S. vehicles and dead Americans and distribute them via the Internet
to win new supporters. Outside Iraq, foreign radicals see the images as confirmation that
the Americans are vulnerable.  IEDs are also killing hundreds of Iraqis as insurgents also
strike police stations, markets, and mosques.  The latest innovation involves the
aggressive use of vehicular bombs, two-thirds of which are driven by suicide bombers.
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An Improvised Explosive Device is a “homemade” mine designed to cause death or
injury by using explosives that are hidden and set off using a variety of trigger
mechanisms.  IEDs can utilize commercial or military explosives, or homemade
explosives, and often the IED builder has had to construct them with the materials at
hand.3  IEDs could also possibly be used in combination with toxic chemicals, biological
toxins, or radiological material, but so far this has not been reported in Iraq.
Some observers speculate that munitions for constructing IEDs may be coming from
a large supply of unexpended Iraqi military ordnance that was gathered and stockpiled in
secret locations throughout Iraq.  In April 2003, Iraqi looters stormed the Al Qaqaa
military weapons site and possibly carried off nearly 400 tons of powerful conventional
explosives, after the site was first abandoned by Iraqi forces and then left unsecured by
U.S. forces.  It is not known exactly when the munitions may have vanished from the site,
and it is possible that Iraqi forces may have removed and relocated some explosives
before the invasion.4
Insurgents have constructed IEDs powerful enough to kill soldiers inside 22-ton
Bradley Fighting Vehicles.  In one incident in 2004, after a Bradley ran over a large IED,
the armored bottom plate of the vehicle was reportedly found some 60 yards from the site
of the explosion.5  In contrast, military units equipped with the 19-ton Stryker medium-
weight armored vehicle, have reportedly suffered a lower number of catastrophic vehicle
losses due to enemy attack.  With a maximum speed of more than 60 mph, the Stryker can
dash past ambushes and roadside IEDs that might catch the slower moving Abrams tank
and Bradley.6  Between December 2003 and October 2004, news reports show that
Strykers deployed in Iraq have successfully withstood 56 attacks by IEDs.  Even when
vehicles were rendered inoperable by the attacks, there was reportedly no loss of life
among the Stryker crews.7
Triggering methods for IEDs may include using a cell phone, a garage door opener,
or a child’s remote-control toy, or may even be as simple as running over a rubber hose
to produce enough air pressure to activate a switch for a mine. At other times, the
insurgent may remain concealed and trigger an IED manually. The following techniques
describe how insurgents can design and deploy IEDs to amplify the damage:
! Coupling.  Coupling is a method of linking one mine or explosive device
to another, usually with detonating cord.  This technique is often used to
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defeat countermeasure equipment.  A heavy mine roller will pass over the
initial, unfused device and set off the second fused device. This in turn
detonates the overpassed device underneath the clearing vehicle.
! Boosting.  Buried mines, or other explosive devices are stacked on top
of one another. The topmost explosives are non-metal, and only the
device buried deepest from the surface is fused.  This reduces the
probability of detection, and it increases the force of the blast. 
! Daisy chaining.  IEDs may be linked together along a roadway with trip
wire or detonating cord. When the initial mine is detonated, the other
mines also detonate.8 
! Shaped Charges.  A cylindrical container is closed off at one end,
packed with explosive, and capped by a conical piece of metal that
becomes a molten projectile when the device is detonated.  The shaped
charge concentrates blast energy to punch through armor plating, and
then propels the molten metal into the vehicle’s cabin.9
Some friendly fire incidents may also be occurring because of tensions owing to
insurgents’ use of vehicle-borne IEDs.  For example, private security contractors driving
vehicles in Iraq have reported that from January to May 2005, they may have been
mistakenly fired upon by U.S. forces at least 20 times as they approached U.S. military
convoys and checkpoints.10
Countermeasures
The U.S. military has increased the quality of armor used for vehicles in Iraq,
including up-armoring the High-Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV,
or Humvees).  However, as an apparent response to use of more heavily armored vehicles,
insurgents have developed even more powerful IEDs, along with more sophisticated
methods for deploying and triggering them.11
The Army has also established an anti-IED task force directed by Brigadier General
Joseph L. Votel to analyze methods for neutralizing IEDs.  Because insurgents in the
recent past have quickly adapted their tactics to avoid new U.S. countermeasures, the
group will also study ways to eliminate sites where IEDs are manufactured in Iraq.
 
 The Pentagon is also searching for new technologies to help find and neutralize
IEDs.  Microwave blasts, radio-frequency jammers, and chemical sensors are among the
CRS-4
12 Sgt. Stephen D’Alessio, 2nd Marine Division, Marines schooled in new bomb protection, July
7 ,  2 0 0 5 ,  [ h t t p : / / w w w . m a r i n e s . m i l / m a r i n e l i n k / m c n 2 0 0 0 . n s f / 0 /
b89628064c45144e85257056003871f1?OpenDocument].
13 Christopher Castelli, “General: Ability to Prematurely Detonate Enemy Bombs Badly Needed,”
Inside the Navy, August 22, 2005, at [http://www.insidedefense.com].
14  Loren B. Thompson, Iraq: Stop the Bombers, Win the War, June 10, 2005, Lexington Institute,
[http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/defense.asp?aid=616]. 
15 Sebastian Sprenger, “U.S., NATO Research Could Help Troops Detect IED Threats from
Afar,” Inside the Pentagon, May 26, 2005.  Noah Shachtman, “Improvised Bombs Baffle Army,”
Wired News, January 26, 2005 [http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,66395,00.html].
16 Noah Shachtman, “Improvised Bombs Baffle Army,” Wired News, January 26, 2006,
[http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,63036,00.html?tw=wn_story_related].
different methods being explored and deployed in this effort.  Examples of electronic
jamming systems mounted on military vehicles include the IED Countermeasures
Equipment (ICE) and the Warlock, which use low-power radio frequency energy to block
the signals of radio controlled explosives initiators, such as cell phones, satellite phones,
and long range cordless telephones.12  The Army has recently ordered thousands of these
radio-frequency jammer devices.  However, experts reportedly caution that the jammers
may only be partially effective because they must be set to operate within the right
frequency range in order to stop an IED.
Some experts believe that a more effective IED countermeasure might be achieved
through technology that can detect IEDs from afar, and then create a pulse of
electromagnetic energy to prematurely detonate them, or burn out and destroy their
circuitry.  Researchers at the Naval Surface Warfare Center’s Dahlgren Laboratory in
Virginia are working on such a solution, called Neutralizing Improvised Explosive
Devices with Radio Frequency (NIRF).  The device, according to a source familiar with
the project, produces a very high-frequency field at very short range that can neutralize
an IEDs electronics.  The Pentagon reportedly will deploy NIRF in Iraq later this year.13
Military contractors are also working on a ways to create a protective area around
moving convoys.14 A Pentagon microwave project, code-named PING, is already
deployed in Iraq, and reportedly has been successful at helping locate insurgent weapons
caches.  The machine, which fits inside a Humvee, sends out electromagnetic waves that
can penetrate a building’s interior to detect IEDs.  Other sensors, such as the Laser-
Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy system (LIBS), are being developed to detect traces of
explosives used for IEDs from as far away as 30 meters.15
The “Talon” is a bomb-disposal Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV), or robot, that
comes equipped with a mechanical arm to pick up and inspect dangerous objects, such as
suspected IEDs. More than a hundred of the remote-control robots are now being used in
Iraq and Afghanistan, with an equal amount on order. Another robot, called the “PackBot”
has also been used by the Army to clear bombs and explore suspected terrorist hideouts.16
Threat data about IEDs, including technical details on how insurgents build the
devices, is tightly controlled by DOD.  Also, proprietary rights must be protected for those
companies who produce IED countermeasures, which limits the distribution to other
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companies of some reports that evaluate the effectiveness of anti-IED systems in battle
and during testing.17  As a result, some industry observers say they are not getting access
to all the information they need to find solutions to counter IEDs.  Some observers also
complain that if information on how enemies build IEDs is released, other insurgents
could possibly learn how to construct even more of the devices.  But others say there is
also a strong likelihood that release of technical information will prompt industry to find
more solutions that will make the IEDS weapons less deadly.18  
Acquisition of Countermeasures
According to press reports, approximately 10,000 Humvees now in Iraq that were
not armored for combat conditions are currently re-enforced using steel plates that might
not withstand the increasingly powerful explosives being used by the insurgents.19  A
recent GAO report also indicated that acquisition delays may have increased the
vulnerability of U.S. forces to the IEDS threat, stating “... specific problems delayed
DOD’s acquisition of three important items we reviewed (Interceptor body armor, lithium
batteries, and up-armored High-Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles).  DOD’s
acquisition decision did not maximize available capacity to produce up-armored
High-Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles and add-on armor kits nor did it give
Congress visibility over the basis for its acquisition solution.  These acquisition
challenges impeded DOD’s ability to respond to rapidly increasing demands.  To
minimize acquisition delays in the future, we recommend the Army and Defense Logistics
Agency assess the industrial-base’s capacity to meet updated requirements for critical
items within the time frames required by operational plans and provide visibility to
Congress over acquisition of critical items that emerge during contingencies.”20 
Actions taken by DOD to minimize future acquisition delays reportedly include
adhering to Army Regulation 700-90, originally dated December 2004, describing policy
for the Army’s Industrial Base Process which requires that the Army publish hardware
priorities, war reserve stocks, and industrial preparedness measures that support war
replenishment objectives and the Army’s Critical Items List.  The Army has also
implemented a “Rapid Fielding Initiative” (RFI) to ensure that soldiers have the latest
available equipment.  Information on the acquisition of critical go-to-war items is reported
to Congress annually through the Industrial Capabilities Report to Congress.
CRS-6
21 Jen DiMascio, “Pentagon Transfers $160 Million to Buy Protection Equipment,” Inside the
Army, January 17, 2005.
22  Glenn Maffei, “Defense Officials Worry Insurgents Will Change IEDS Tactics, Tech,” Inside
the Army, May 9, 2005.
23  Jen DiMascio, “Congress OKs $129.7 Million Transfer to Fund IEDS Countermeasures,”
Inside the Army, May 30, 2005.
24  Glenn, Maffei, “Order Made for Final “Warlock” Batch to Tackle IEDS Problem in Iraq,”
Inside the Army, July 25, 2005.
Funding for Countermeasures
The Joint IEDS Defeat Task Force has reportedly spent $378 million since 2003 to
buy electronic jammers to counter IEDs.  However, funding to purchase anti-IEDS
electronic jammers has reportedly traditionally come through congressional plus-ups and
reprogramming actions, and not through ordinary line-item funding in the fiscal year
budget.21 
  
On April 30, 2005, the Army was granted “rapid acquisition authority” by Defense
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, meaning that the traditional DOD acquisition process could
be set aside, allowing a manufacturer of a special, man-portable IEDS jammer device to
be chosen within only a 15 day time period.22  The Pentagon plans to purchase 10,000 of
the devices, at $1,000 each.  On May 24, 2005, Congress approved a transfer of $129.7
million from the Iraqi Freedom Fund to purchase mobile, multiband Warlock jammers
which can detect threats concealed on people and in vehicles, and to support R&D and
deployment for other anti-IEDS devices.23  On July 13, 2005, a reprogramming action
transferred $10 million out of Iraqi Freedom Fund for two new anti-IEDS systems: $3.5
million for 50 Small, Lightweight Advanced Modular Digital Electronic Protection
Systems (SLAM-DEP), which incorporates existing jammer technology into a wearable
vest, and $6.5 million to purchase 187 low-cost, expendable robots designed for explosive
ordnance disposal.24
The Senate version of the Department of Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2006 (S. 1043), passed on November 15, 2005, authorizes $500,000,000 of the Iraq
Freedom Fund solely  for support of the Joint IEDS Task Force.  The House version of
the National Defense Authorization Act (HR.1815), passed on May 25, 2005, contains
no similar provision.
The Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2006, as amended by the Senate
(H.R. 2863.EAS), earmarks $750,000,000 from the Iraq Freedom Fund for the Joint IED
Defeat Task Force.  The version passed by the House (H.R. 2863.EH) contains no similar
provision.
